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Interactions Between Memory Refreshment
Doctrine and Work Product Protection
Under the Federal Rules
Memory refreshment doctrine, a common law rule of evidence1
codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 612,2 permits a witness to use
documents in order to stimulate his recollection. Under the doctrine,
the opposing attorney may be given the opportunity to inspect docu-
ments used for this purpose. In civil cases, 3 a possible conflict arises
between this doctrine and that of work product protection, which is
codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). The conflict
arises when a witness sees work product prior to testifying. 4 If all the
materials he sees are automatically considered memory refreshment
materials, the opposing side may be able to obtain them without the
showing required by Rule 26(b)(3),5 even if they have not contributed
to the testimony in the manner anticipated by Rule 612.6
This conflict materialized in Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodah
Co.,7 in which a federal court established the rule that all materials
seen by a witness prior to testifying may be inspected by opposing
counsel under Rule 612. The refreshment doctrine, the court said, en-
compasses all materials shown to a witness prior to testifying.8 Under
1. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
2. "The treatment of writings used to refresh recollection while on the stand is in
accord with settled doctrine." FED. R. EVID. 612, Advisory Committee's Note. "[Under FED.
R. EVID. 612,] the production of writings used by a witness to refresh his memory before
testifying [is] discretionary with the court in the interests of justice, as is the case under
existing federal law." H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973), reprinted in
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 74 (1975), ap-
pended to FED. R. EVID. 612.
3. See 120 CONG. REc. 2381 (1974) (Reps. White and Hungate) (FED. R. EvID. 612 ap-
plies to both civil and criminal cases). The conflict between memory refreshment inspec-
tion and work product protection arises in civil cases because work product protection
contrasts with the usual policy of broad discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511-12 (1947).
4. The rule is the same whether the witness is testifying at trial or in a deposition.
See Fenner, Competency and Examination of Witnesses Under Article VI of the Federal
Rules of Evidence and the Nebraska Evidence Rules, 9 CREIGHTON L. REv. 559, 593
(1976).
5. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), an attorney must show substantial need for the
work product, and undue hardship in obtaining the information elsewhere in order to
discover work product.
6. See note 51 infra.
7. 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
8. See id. at 617.
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this interpretation, Rule 612, a rule of evidence, acts to override the
rule of discovery that requires a showing of substantial need and undue
hardship before work product may be obtained.
This Note argues that such an interpretation substantially alters
the law of memory refreshment and unnecessarily sacrifices protection
of work product. After examining the background, nature, and pur-
poses of the memory refreshment and work product protection doc-
trines, the Note concludes that the expansion of memory refreshment
doctrine authorized by Berkey is unwarranted. The proper balance is
the one struck by existing law, which limits the scope of memory re-
freshment. inspection and requires litigants to rely on discovery pro-
cedures in order to obtain those materials not strictly within the proper
scope of memory refreshment inspection.
I. Memory Refreshment Doctrine
A. Memory Refreshment While Testifying
At common law and under Rule 612, 9 when the memory of a wit-
ness fails while that witness is testifying, the attorney examining him
may seek to stimulate his recollection.'" He may show the witness
documents, photographs, or any other materials that may cause him
to recall the facts he has forgotten.'1 If the witness's memory is re-
freshed and the witness testifies from that memory,12 the opposing
9. FED. R. EVID. 612 states, in part:
[I]f a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory for the purpose of testifying,
either-
(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in the
interests of justice,
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect
it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions
which relate to the testimony of the witness.
10. See Phillips v. Wyrick, 558 F.2d 489, 496-97 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1088 (1978) (witness who is unable to recall matters about which he will testify may use
notes to refresh his memory); United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 190-91 (4th Cir.
1975) (attorney may supply memorandum to witness to refresh his memory at trial);
Comment, Witness' Use of Memoranda: Present Recollection Revived and Past Recollec-
tion Recorded, 6 Cuss. L. Rrv. 471, 471 (1975) (refreshment permissible). If the witness's
recollection is not stimulated, the doctrine of memory refreshment cannot apply. 3 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, NVEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE f 612[01], at 612-12 (1977) (if memory not
refreshed, memorandum may enter evidence only as past recollection recorded) [herein-
after cited as VEINSTEIN & BERGER].
11. United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964, 967-68 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
806 (1947) (anything may be used to refresh witness's recollection).
12. The memory, and not the materials refreshing it, is the evidence. United States v.
Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 191 (4th Cir. 1975); 10 MooE's FEDERAL PRAcrICE § 612.02, at
VI-199 (2d ed. 1976); see 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, suPra note 10, 612[01], at 612-12.
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attorney has the right to inspect the materials involved and to employ
them in cross-examining the witness. 13
The judge participates in every step of this process.' 4 Before the
witness may see anything, the judge must find that his memory has
lapsed. 13 Then, after the attorney shows or gives the witness the
materials, the judge must be satisfied that they have apparently re-
freshed the witness's memory; 16 whether they have actually done so is
a question of fact bearing on the credibility of the witness.' 7 Upon
motion by the opposing party, the judge will order that the materials
be given to that party for inspection and use in cross-examination."
If no privilege or possibility of prejudice dictates a contrary result,'
the judge may allow the jury to see the materials. 2
0
Thus, the scope of inspection granted under memory refreshment
13. See United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (that materials
are inspectable when used to refresh memory of witness while testifying is "hornbook
rule of evidence"); 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 10, 612[01], at 612-13 (adverse party
entitled to inspect materials used for recollection and to show materials to jury; common
law practice followed in federal courts). Dean Wigmore points out that the rule per-
mitting inspection has two parts: the right to inspect the materials in order to avoid
"imposition and false aids" and the right to cross-examine on the materials in order to
"detect circumstances not appearing on the surface, and [to] expose all that detracts from
the weight of testimony." 3 J. WzGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 762, at
136 (J. Chadbourn ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
14. See Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d 753, 760 (8th Cir. 1967) (court reviews aspects
of memory refreshment doctrine and how judges participate in all steps of process); S)m-
posium, Article VI of the Federal Rules of Evidence: Witnesses, 36 LA. L. REv. 99, 106-07
(1975) (court should balance "the likelihood that the memorandum will actually refresh
the witness's memory against the possibility of undue suggestion").
15. 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 10, 612[01], at 612-9 (witness must satisfy trial
judge that he lacks "effective present recollection"); see Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d
753, 760 (8th Cir. 1967) (before attempt to refresh memory may take place, witness's re-
collection must be exhausted).
16. See Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d 753, 761 (8th Cir. 1967) (witness must testify
that his memory has been refreshed); United States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883, 890 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 941 (1949) (trial judge "investigated . . . claim to present
recollection"); McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 9, at 17 (E. Cleary 2d
ed. 1972) ("preliminary question for [the trial judge's] decision whether the memorandum
actually does refresh") [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
17. See United States v. Cheyenne, 558 F.2d 902, 905-06 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 957 (1977) (weight to be given to refreshed testimony is matter for trier of fact);
United States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883, 888-89 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 941 (1949)
(truth of assertion of present memory is matter of witness's credibility for trier of fact).
18. See note 13 supra.
19. See Phillips v. Wyrick, 558 F.2d 489, 497 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1088 (1978) (if notes are prejudicial and jury would be unable to weigh their credibility,
they might not be admissible, read aloud, or seen by jury).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (although it
may not ordinarily be admissible, report used by witness to refresh memory may be ad-
mitted when opposing party so moves or when jury asks to see it). The court admits the
materials into evidence because of their function as memory aids and not for the truth of
their contents. See 3 WIGMIORE, supra note 13, § 763.
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doctrine is limited. Only those materials or portions of materials that
refresh the memory of the witness on the specific contents of his
testimony may be inspected by opposing counsel.2 1
B. Memory Refreshment Prior to Testifying
Even though memory refreshment prior to testifying 22 is not visible
to the court, it is theoretically identical to memory refreshment while
testifying: the attorney merely anticipates a possible lapse in memory
and forestalls it.23 Determining the proper scope of inspection for
pretrial memory refreshment materials in a given case is difficult, since
pretrial memory refreshment, unlike refreshment during trial, does
not occur in front of the judge. The difficulty is based on the fact
that the judge has no power to rule on whether to allow refreshment
before the fact. In order to compensate for this lack of judicial super-
vision, pretestimony refreshment materials are only open to inspection
if the judge, in his discretion, so decides..2 4 The judge is to be guided
by a presumption that, because the goals of inspection are the same no
21. United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Schwartz v. Broad-
cast Music, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 31, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). Few problems exist in determining
which materials are involved when refreshment takes place on the stand. In that situa-
tion, the issue arises in relation to a specific answer to a specific question or line of
questions, The process of refreshment is public; the refreshment occurs in the presence
of the judge, and the materials given to the witness are identifiable.
22. Refreshing a witness's memory prior to that witness's testifying is permissible. See,
e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 9, at 14-15 (memory refreshment prior to trial ad-
vocated); 3 W.IGNORE, supra note 13, § 762, at 140 ("no objection" to pretrial refresh-
ment).
23. For example, in State v. Deslovers, 40 R.I. 89, 100 A. 64 (1917), the medical
examiner, prior to testifying, used notes that he dictated at the time of the examination
to refresh his memory. Id. at 103-05, 100 A. at 69-70. He then testified from memory. The
court held that inspection should have been permitted because the doctor had used the
notes prior to testifying as he would have used them had his memory lapsed while he
was on the stand. Id. at 104-05, 100 A. at 69-70.
24. FED. R. EvID. 612; see Needelman v. United States, 261 F.2d 802, 806-07 (5th Cir.
1958), cert. dismissed, 362 U.S. 600 (1960) (request for inspection denied). A requirement
of inspection of pretestifing refreshment materials has arisen only when the memory of
the witness is refreshed while the witness is testifying. Thus no unlimited right to in-
spection of materials used to refresh the witness's memory prior to testifying exists.
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 132 (1942), overruled on other grounds, Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see United States v. Atkinson, 513 F.2d 38, 41 (4th
Cir. 1975). The final draft of FED. R. EvID. 612 gave the opposing side a right to
materials used to refresh the memory of the witness prior to his testimony, but the
House Judiciary Committee, concerned that such breadth would lead to fishing expedi-
tions, eliminated the right to inspection find rewrote the portion of FED. R. Evw. 612
relating to pretestifying refreshment. The rewritten provision embodies the common
law requirement that judicial discretion be exercised. See FED. R. EvID. 612, Advisory
Committee's Note; H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1973), reprinted in FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 74 (1975), appended to
FED. R . EvID. 612.
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matter when the refreshment takes place,2 5 the scope of inspection
should remain constant.2 6 The court should thus find that the witness's
memory was refreshed within the meaning of the term as applied to
refreshment while testifying before it orders inspection .2
The most important element in finding that the witness's memory
was refreshed prior to his testimony is the statement of the witness to
that effect .2  This testimony replaces the apparent refreshment that
25. See State v. Hunt, 25 N.J. 514, 525, 138 A.2d 1, 7 (1958) (reasons for inspection
are same no matter when memory is refreshed); 3 WVIGmORE, supra note 13, § 762, at 1.40
("the risk of imposition and the need for safeguard is just as great" if memory refreshed
prior to trial); 37 Mo. L. REV. 571, 575 (1972) ("The same evils which attend use of the
document to revive memory on the stand also attend the use of the document to rei~e
memory out of court.")
26. The Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 612 implies that the scope of
inspection of pretestimony refreshment materials should match the scope of inspection
of materials used by the witness while testif)ing by repudiating the distinction between
memory refreshment prior to testifying and memory refreshment on the stand. Judicial
discretion was added to the final draft of the Rule in order to prevent the scope of
inspection of pretestifying refreshment materials from becoming broader than tile scope
of inspection of materials used at trial. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973),
reprinted in FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 74
(1975), aiPended to FED. R. EvID. 612. FED. R. EvID. 612 thus seeks to make memoiy
refreshment one internally consistent doctrine. In order to accomplish this, the scope of
inspection of pretestimony memory refreshment materials must match the scope of in-
spection allowed when memory is refreshed on the stand.
27. State v. Mucci, 25 N.J. 423, 436, 136 A.2d 761, 768 (1957) (memory refreshment rule
applicable to writings used prior to trial as they would have been used on stand);
State v. Deslovers, 40 R.I. 89, 104-05, 100 A. 64, 70 (1917) (witness "must be said to hase
obtained substantially the same assistance from the record [examined prior to testifying]
which he would have obtained from its perusal during his examination"). Judicial discre-
tion exercised after the fact of refreshment replaces the judicial participation that ac.
companies refreshment while testifying. The fact that judicial discretion must be
exercised before inspection of pretrial refreshment materials is allowed implies that the
court must find that memory refreshment has actually occurred; otherwise, there would
be no reason to require the exercise of discretion. See United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d
1181, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (no inspection when no memory refreshment took place);
Spurrier v. United States, 389 F.2d 367, 368 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 922
(1968) (per curiam) (no inspection when notes made by witness to refresh his recollection
were not so used by him).
28. To establish that a witness's memory was refreshed prior to testifying, the opposing
attorney must ask him whether his recollection was refreshed. See, e.g., Needelman 1'.
United States, 261 F.2d 802, 806 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed, 362 U.S. 600 (1960) (wit-
ness "admitted" ie refreshed his memory prior to testifying); State v. Deslosers, 40 R.I.
89, 104, 100 A. 64, 69 (1917) (witness testified that lie had refreshed his memorA); cf.
Fenner, supra note 4, at 597 (memory refreshment could be uncolered if all 1isitnesses
were routinely asked if their memory was refreshed prior to testimony). When a witness
does not testify that his memory was refreshed prior to his testimony, either because lie
was not asked or because, when asked, he answered that his memor) was not refreshed,
no inspection will result. See United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1189 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (inspection denied because no statement by witness that his memory was refreshed
appeared in record); Rawlings v. Andersen, 195 Neb. 686, 695-96, 240 N.W.2d 568, 574
(1976) (witness, though she "glanced" at materials, (lid Iot use them to refresh her
memory since her memory had not failed). FED. R. EVID. 612 indicates that tle opposing
party is not entitled to inspect a document used to refresh a witness's memory prior to
his testimony until after the witness takes the stand and tile fact of memory refreshment
has been established. By allowing inspection only at this stage, Congress and the courts
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must occur in court before the judge will order inspection when
memory is refreshed on the stand.29 Courts also consider the time
that has elapsed between the witness's perusal of the documents and
his testimony,30 the nature and intent of the perusal,3 1 and the im-
mediacy of the effect on the witness's testimony.
32
Because establishing that memory refreshment has taken place is
more difficult when it does not take place under the court's direct
supervision, it is arguable that the scope of inspection should be
broader when the refreshment has taken place privately. A broader
sweep might forestall improper attorney influence over the witness's
testimony:33 Courts have not, however, responded to this problem by
broadening the scope of inspection; instead, they have made inspection
orders specific and imposed strict controls to ensure that inspection
does not become overly broad.3 4 When materials are used prior to the
giving of testimony, the need for inspection prevails over interests in
trial preparation privacy only when the materials have been used by
have decided that the interest in advance preparation for cross-examination does not
outweigh the danger of excessive intrusion into the trial preparation process. See, e.g.,
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512-13 (1947) (request for materials to help in preparing
to cross-examine witnesses not enough to justify violating attorney privacy).
29. See p. 392 sulpra. The testimony helps to ensure that the scope of inspection is no
broader when the witness's memory is refreshed prior to testifying than it would have
been had his memory been refreshed on the stand. See Rawlings v. Andersen, 195 Neb.
686, 695-96, 240 N.W.2d 568, 574 (1976). Of course, nothing in the memory refreshment
doctrine operates to prevent the witness from perjuring himself by testifying that his
memory was not refreshed prior to his testimony. See 3 WEINS'rEIN & BFRGER, supra note
10, C 612[05], at 612-35 n.1 ("There is no machinery for asertaining [sic] the existence of
[memory refreshment materials] other than reliance on the integrity of witness and
counsel.")
30. See State v. Mucci, 25 N.J. 423, 434, 436, 136 A.2d 761, 766, 768 (1957) (one factor
favoring inspection was that witnesses had their memories refreshed on morning of trial);
State v. Deslovers, 40 R.I. 89, 104, 100 A. 64, 69 (1917) (phenomenon of pretestimony
refreshment was like refreshment on stand partly because witness had refreshed his
memory "that very morning"); Burke, Witness Rules Change, Codify Nebraska Law, 53
NEB. L. Rv. 406, 414 (1974) (refreshing memory on "courthouse steps" no different from
refreshing memory on stand); Symposium, supra note 14, at 108 ("slight temporal dif-
ference" in point at which memory refreshed should not affect right to inspection of
materials).
31. See Rawlings v. Andersen, 195 Neb. 686, 695-96, 240 N.W.2d 568, 574 (1976)
("glance" to affirm memory does not constitute memory refreshment).
32. See United States v. Cheyenne, 558 F.2d 902, 905 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
957 (1977) (where witness testified at hearing from refreshed recollection one day, and
then testified to same facts at trial on subsequent day, witness did not refresh his
recollection for purpose of testifying at trial). In the text of FEn. R. EVID. 612 itself, the
requirement that the memory be refreshed "for the purpose of testifying" embodies the
immediate impact rule of th6 common law.
33. See p. 400 infra.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Under
Nebraska Evidence Rule 612, NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-612 (Supp. 1975), the opposing party
has a right to all materials used to refresh the memory of the witness prior to trial. This
has not led to broad inspection because Nebraska courts adhere strictly to a narrow
conception of memory refreshment. See Rawlings v. Andersen, 195 Neb. 686, 695-96, 240
N.W.2d 568, 574 (1976).
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the witness as they would have been had the witness been on the
stand.35 Narrow construction of the memory refreshment doctrine high-
lights its nature as a rule of evidence, as opposed to a rule of dis-
covery.30
II. The Conflict Between Memory Refreshment
Doctrine and Work Product Protection
A. The Source of the Conflict: Work Product Protection
A possible conflict exists in civil cases between memory refreshment
doctrine, which allows inspection of materials, and work product pro-
tection, which guards materials from discovery.37 Work product protec-
tion, endorsed by the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor"8 and
codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3),3 9 prevents one
35. The court in State v. Deslovers, 40 R.I. 89, 100 A. 64 (1917), argued that the
witness had used the materials prior to testifying exactly as he would have done on the
stand; hence, the fact that refreshment had occurred prior to testifying could not justify
noninspection. Id. at 104-05, 100 A. at 69-70; see Spurrier v. United States, 389 F.2d 367
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 922 (1968) (per curiam) (no inspection when witness
made notes to refresh his memory but did not use them).
36. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 235-36 (1975) (rules of pretrial discovery
not applicable to "evidentiary questions arising at trial"). If the witness does not testify
about the contents of his refreshed recollection, no inspection will result. Moreover, the
scope of inspection is restricted rigidly to the materials that refreshed the witness's
memory relating to the specific content of his testimony. Memory refreshment doctrine is
more specific and limited than pretrial discovery. See United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d
1181, 1188-89 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (even if witness saw whole document prior to testifying,
only portions that refreshed his memory on exact contents of testimony would be in-
spectable); Schwartz v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 31, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (inspection
of memory refreshment materials limited to those portions actually used to refresh
recollection; for "fuller discovery of these documents, (the defendants] must utilize the
normal discovery procedure"). Memory refreshment doctrine also permits inspection of
materials that may not be obtained through pretrial discovery. See Bailey v. Meister
Brau, Inc. 57 F.R.D. 11, 13 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (if documents handed to plaintiff at deposi-
tion to refresh his recollection, then those documents necessary for cross-examination and
lose their work product status); Doxtator v. Swarthout, 38 A.D.2d 782, 782, 328 N.Y.S.2d
150, 151-52 (1972) (when witness stated that she used notes protected from discoier, as
work product to refresh her recollection prior to testif)ing, notes were subject to in-
spection); cf. State v. Hunt, 25 N.J. 514, 524, 138 A.2d 1, 6 (1958) (court differentiates
between request for discovery of notes prior to trial and request for inspection as memory
refreshment materials at trial, when memory was refreshed prior to trial).
37. See notes 44 & 45 infra.
38. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) states, in part:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things . . . prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial . . . only upon a showing that the party seeking
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and
that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of
the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the
required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation.
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party from obtaining the trial preparation materials of the other.4 0
These materials include witness statements taken by an attorney
4'
that reflect his mental processes4 2 and memoranda consisting entirely
of attorney opinion.43 Some courts have held opinion work product
protection to be absolute; 44 those that have permitted its discovery
have carefully sought to protect the opinion element.
45
Discovery of work product is permitted only when that work product
contains important facts not obtainable elsewhere.4 6 In such a situation,
the need for the facts outweighs the need for protection. 47 A further
40. There -has been much debate over the value of work product protection. See, e.g.,
Cooper, Work Product of the Rulesmakers, 53 MINN. L. REV. 1269 (1969) (argues against
absolute work product protection); Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L.
REv. 940, 1027-46 (1961) (supports strong, nonabsolute work product protection). The
debate in the literature has not prompted similar doubts in Congress or the courts:
protection of work product under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) has increased so as to be
virtually absolute. See note 44 infra (citing cases).
41. Witness statements are perhaps the most frequently litigated work product docu-
ments. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Teribery v. Norfolk & W. Ry.,
68 F.R.D. 46 (W.D. Pa. 1975). See generally Address by Fred Freund, Columbia Law
School Alumni Association (Mar. 23, 1968), reprinted in 45 F.R.D. 493, 496 (1968) (most
work product cases concern witness statements).
42. Hickman v. Ta)lor, 329 U.S. 495, 513 (1947) (notes on witness statements taken by
attorney reflect "what he saw fit to write down").
43. The most compelling showing of need must be made in order to discover attorney
opinion. See Bird v. Penn Cent. Co., 61 F.R.D. 43, 46 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (discovery of
opinion work product only when opinion itself has become fact in issue; issue here is
what "plaintiffs knew or should have known"). For an analysis of the issues surrounding
discovery of opinion work product, see Note, Protection of Opinion Work Product Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 64 VA. L. REV. 333 (1978).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) has been interpreted as conferring nearly absolute im-
munity on opinion work product. See In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977)
("nearly absolute immunity"); Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz,
509 F.2d 730, 732 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975) (opinion work product
"immune from discovery"); cf. Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947) (in Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, "[t]he word 'shall' is ordinarily 'the language of command' ").
But see Note, supra note 43, at 337 (FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) is ambiguous as to extent of
protection to be afforded to opinion work product).
45. Even when work product is not absolutely protected, discovery will only be
permitted after a strong showing of need. See Xerox Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367,
375-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (rigorous showing required for discovery); Bird v. Penn Cent. Co.,
61 F.R.D. 43, 47 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (court exercised "extreme diligence to protect" work
product). Discovery doctrine operates only to ensure that both sides have the facts; other
materials, and particularly opinions, are rigorously excluded. See Reliable Transfer Co. v.
United States, 53 F.R.D. 24, 25 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (no discovery of opinions based on dis-
coverable facts); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 7 F.R.D. 183, 185 (D. Del. 1947)
(discovery of economic facts but not conclusions based on them).
46. Such a showing satisfies the requirement of substantial need and undue hardship.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see United States v. O.K. Tire & Rubber Co., 71 F.R.D. 465, 467
(D. Idaho 1976) (discovery of work product not ordered if information available else-
where); Teribery v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 68 F.R.D. 46, 47-48 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (discovery
allowed when information essential and otherwise unobtainable).
47. Mutual knowledge of facts is the purpose of discovery; avoiding surprise at trial
is a major goal. See United States v. IBM Corp., 68 F.R.D. 315, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). But
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sense of the importance of work product protection is indicated by the
fact that, although work product protection is a pretrial discovery
doctrine, attorney privacy is considered so essential that the protection
continues during trial48 and even after litigation has ended.
49
The possibility of conflict between work product protection and
memory refreshment inspection arises when a witness sees work product
prior to testifying.50 The conflict is most likely to occur when the
witness's participation in the litigation goes beyond testifying and
extends into the realm of trial preparation. For example, a client-
witness or an investigator-witness often has contact with work product
prior to testifying. If the court were to classify such work product as
memory refreshment material, it would lose its protected status and
be open to inspection. Moreover, a court can further erode the protec-
tion afforded to work product by ordering inspection of all such
material the witness has seen, rather than only that material actually
used to refresh the witness's memory.5 1
B. The Berkey Ruling on Memory Refreshment
The potential conflict between memory refreshment doctrine and
work product protection materialized in an interlocutory evidence
decision in the Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. antitrust
see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840, 845 (8th Cir. 1973) (quoting United
States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)) ("[Viital public policy considerations ...dictate
that the need for protection of an attorney's work product 'outweighs] the public in-
terest in the search for truth.' ")
48. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975).
49. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 735
(4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
50. This potential conflict between the two doctrines was foreseen by Congress, the
treatises, and the scholarly literature, See, e.g., 120 CONG. R.c. 2382 (1974) (Rep. Hun-
gate) (conflict exists when "two legal concepts at each other's throats"); 3 WEIrNSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 10, 612[04 ], at 612-30, 32-35; Comment, Witnesses Under Article VI of
the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 1236, 1271 (1969). The issue
was raised in Congress during the consideration of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Representative White expressed concern that work product might be obtained by the
adverse party under FED. R. EviD. 612 if anything a witness might "use" prior to testif~ing
would be a "memory refreshener" and hence subject to inspection under FED. R. EVWD.
612. 120 CONG. Rac. 2381-82 (1974).
51. See note 28 supra (inspection only if materials actually used to refresh memor)).
Courts draw a boundary line between materials merely looked at by a witness prior to
testifying and materials actually used to refresh the witness's memory prior to testifying.
See Bercow v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 39 F.R.D. 357, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (court denied
motion to compel answer to question "what documents have you looked at in prepara-
tion for this deposition today?" because question represented "an indirect attempt to
ascertain the manner in which an adversary is preparing for trial"); cf. United States v.
Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 969 & n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (alternative holding) (report read by
police officer on stand admissible as memory refreshment material and would have been
admissible if reviewed prior to testifying).
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litigation.2 The plaintiff sought several notebooks of facts prepared
to assist two experts hired by the defendant in formulating their
opinions.5 3 The notebooks clearly were work product:5 4 although the
particular facts had already been discovered by the plaintiff,55 the
order in which defendant's attorneys had organized them in the note-
books involved attorney mental processes. 50
Plaintiff sought the notebooks under Rule 612, 57 and Judge Marvin
Frankel said that, although the motion would not be granted, similar
motions would be granted in the future.58 Rule 612, the court held,
covers all materials shown to a witness prior to his testimony because
any materials that have an impact on testimony qualify as memory
refreshment documents subject to inspection5 9 Since everything seen
by a witness arguably has such an impact, the court reasoned, Rule
612 covers all such materials. 60 The result was dictated by the danger
52. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., [1978-2] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
1 62,174 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1978) (final judgment). The evidence ruling in question in this
Note is Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
53. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
54. Id. at 616 ("It seems clear that [the notebooks] are indeed 'work product' in an
essential sense of the term. They are counsel's ordering of the 'facts,' referring to the
prospective proofs, organizing, aligning, and marshaling empirical data with the view to
combative employment that is the hallmark of the adversary enterprise.")
55. Id. at 617 ("The materials actually made available [to plaintiff] .. . cover all the
concrete and specifically identifiable points on which the experts were instructed or
advised for their testimony.")
56. Id. at 616 ("The pages collate the expected or imagined or hoped-for proofs of
the propositions counsel has learned and written. There is the evident residue and
reflection of '. . . mental impressions, personal beliefs.' and other products of the
advocate's professional interaction with the materials of his art.")
57. Id. at 614.
58. The court created the prospective rule that all materials seen by a witness prior
to testifying are open to inspection by the other side. Id. at 617. The rule was made
prospective because "[t]here is no indication at all [in this case] of a calculated plan to
exploit the work product . . . for preparing the experts while planning to erect the
shield of privilege against discovery" and because "given the current development of the
law in this quarter, it seems fair to say that counsel were not vividly aware of the
potential for a stark choice between withholding the notebooks from the experts or
turning them over to opposing counsel." Id.
59. Id. at 615.
60. Compare id. ("Rule 612 . . . was designed to permit 'access * to those
writings which may fairly be said in fact to have an impact upon the testimony of the
witness' ") (quoting FED. R. EVID. 612, Advisory Committee's Note) (ellipsis in original)
with FED. R. EvID. 612, Advisory Committee's Note ("The purpose of the phrase 'for the
purpose of testifying' is to safeguard against . . . wholesale exploration of an opposing
party's files and to insure that access is limited only to those writings which may fairly
be said in fact to have an impact upon the testimony of the witness.") To fall within the
scope of FED. R. EvIo. 612, documents must have both refreshed the witness's memory
and had an impact on the testimony; in other words, they must have refreshed the
witness's memory on facts to which he testifies. The Berkey court made impact the sole
test, leading to the conclusion that all materials seen by a witness prior to his testifying
are open to inspection under FED. R. EvID. 612.
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that such materials would impermissibly influence a witness's testi-
mony.61
In Berkey, Rule 612 becomes a rule of discovery6 2 covering every-
thing shown to a witness prior to his testimony, whether used to
refresh memory or not. As a result, Rule 612 does not remain a rule
of evidence dealing exclusively with memory refreshment. In Berkey,
no refreshment took place; in fact, there was testimony showing that
it had not.03 The overriding concern of the court, however, was to
prevent the attorney from using his work product to structure a wit-
ness's testimony and then withholding that work product from the
opposing party.' 4
The court mentioned possible conflict between the rule it created
and work product protection,65 but did not attempt to balance the
two doctrines. After classifying the materials as work product, 0 the
court continued: "the privilege sheltering [work product] materials
may be waived. It is not, in any event, absolute." 67 Judge Frankel then
examined the waiver doctrine and the qualified nature of work product
privilege," but did not assess the specific need for work product dis-
covery under the circumstances. Such an inquiry would probably not
lead to disclosure in fact situations similar to Berkey. All relevant
materials in Berkey had already been "made available for cross-
61. The Berkey rule renders all other goals secondary to the need for cross-examina-
tion in order to expose impermissible influence on the witness. 74 F.R.D. at 617. But see
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 513 (1947) ("Petitioner's counsel frankly admits that
he wants the [work product] only to help prepare himself to examine witnesses and to
make sure that lie has overlooked nothing. That is insufficient . . . to permit him an
exception to the policy underlying the privacy of [opposing counsel's] professional
activities."); United States v. IBM Corp., 72 F.R.D. 78, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (assertion of
need for materials to cross-examine is not enough to justify discovery of materials not
otherwise discoverable).
62. See 74 F.R.D. at 617 ("[t]here would appear.., to be room for allowing discovery"
under FED. R. Ev. 612) (emphasis added). The term "discovery," however, belongs to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and to pretrial revelation of materials. FED. R.
EvD. 612 deals with inspection of materials under an evidentiary doctrine, not a rule of
discovery. See note 36 sufkra.
63. See 74 F.R.D. at 614 (footnote omitted):
At his deposition, one of defendant's experts ... testified that he had received the
... notebooks at some point during the past winter .... To the question whether
he had the notebooks in his possession when he prepared the outline of his "witness
book" for production to plaintiff, the witness replied: "I don't recall, because we did
not use them ...." Another of the experts ... states that he read the ... volume
and that this "served to fill in details ... 
64. Id. at 617.
65. Id. at 616 ("We are led to assess, therefore, the countervailing force of the work
product privilege invoked by defendant.")
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 616-17.
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examination" through discovery, 0 and there was persuasive evidence
that the plaintiff did not need the materials.70 The absence of need
for work product, however, does not appear to have been a factor in
the court's decision to allow discovery in future, identical cases.
71
The court attempted to explain the policy basis for its holding by
asserting that "[t]here would appear . . . to be room for allowing dis-
covery, either on a theory of waiver [of work product protection] or of
qualified [work product] privilege, where an attempt is made to
exceed decent limits of preparation on the one hand and concealment
on the other."72 But although this explanation is relevant to the show-
ing of need required by Rule 26(b)(3), it is irrelevant to the showing
of memory refreshment demanded by Rule 612. The use of the word
"discovery" in connection with Rule 612 typifies this confusion.7 3
When a showing is made that there has been such an attempt "to
exceed the decent limits of preparation" as the court described, it
might be held that the Rule 26(b)(3) requirement of demonstrating
substantial need and undue hardship has been fulfilled and that dis-
covery should be permitted.7 4 The Berkey court, however, created an
automatic rule.73 Work product is thus made available to the opposing
side without any demonstration of need; in fact, none could have
69. Id. at 617.
70. See id.
71. The element of need is determinative in discovery of work product. FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(3). A showing under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) inevitably involves weighing the
need for discovery against the need for protection.
72. 74 F.R.D. at 617.
73. See note 62 supra.
74. In Xerox Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the court held
that nonprivileged facts may not be hidden in work product and so kept from the other
side:
A party should not be allowed to conceal critical, non-privileged, discoverable in-
formation, which is uniquely within the knowledge of the party and which is. not
obtainable from any other source, simply by imparting the information to its at-
torney and then attempting to hide behind the work product doctrine after the
party fails to remember the information.
Demonstration that such a state of affairs exists satisfies the requirement of FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(3). Id. at 382. There are, however, limits on the resulting discovery. If the facts
are separable from the opinion, the court said, then they may be distilled and handed
over separately. If the facts cannot be so distilled, the document, including the opinions,
must be handed over. The breadth of the discovery therefore is deceptive: the court
held that it would examine the documents and "excise, if feasible, privileged informa-
tion." rd. at 382.
Although work product must contain facts in order to be discoverable, that it does so
is not a sufficient reason for discovery. See Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D.
26, 41-42 (D. Md. 1974) (documents containing mental impressions of attorney or other
representative of party not discoverable "merely because" they include factual data);
Crocker v. United States, 51 F.R.D. 155, 156 (N.D. Miss. 1970) (no discovery of facts when
facts and opinion in agent's report are inseparable).
75. 74 F.R.D. at 617 ("materials considered work product should be withheld from
prospective witnesses if they are to be withheld from opposing parties").
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been made in this case.76 Even if such a demonstration had been made
it would have related only to Rule 26(b)(3), and would have been
irrelevant to Rule 612, under which the sole issue is whether the
memory of the witness was refreshed.
III. The Proper Relationship of Memory Refreshment Doctrine
to Work Product Discovery
The Berkey court created its new rule in order to forestall excessive
use of work product in preparing witnesses to testify.77 But the rule
catches in its broad sweep work product that should be immune from
discovery. The court's goal might have been accomplished without
changing existing law or making such broad inroads into work product
protection. That Rule 612 and Rule 26(b)(3) need not clash at all78
becomes apparent when one looks more closely at the purposes of
these two doctrines and at their relationship to each other.
A. The Purposes of Memory Refreshment Doctrine
Courts have employed three major rationales to justify inspection of
materials used to refresh a witness's memory. The first is that the
opposing counsel needs the materials in order to test the existence and
accuracy of the memory itself.79 This explanation, however, is invalid
because one purpose of all cross-examination is to test memory.80 Since
the witness is supposed to be testifying from his memory and not from
the document, testing a refreshed memory does not differ from testing
any other memory the witness recounts on the stand. If cross-examina-
tion is effective to test unrefreshed memory, it should be sufficient to
test refreshed memory as well.
The second major rationale for inspection is that the opposing at-
torney needs the document in order to test its power to evoke the
memory to which the witness testifies.8 ' But the possibility of obscure
76. Id.; see note 55 supra.
77. 74 F.R.D. at 617.
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) "by [its] terms [does] not cover disclosure pursuant to
Rule 612." 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 10, 612[04], at 612-30.
79. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 9, at 15-19 (right to memorandum to cross-examine
on credibility of claim that memory was refreshed). The witness must testify from current,
refreshed memory and not from the document. See, e.g., Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d
753, 761 (8th Cir. 1967) (witness must testify from present memory).
80. See State v. Hunt, 25 NJ. 514, 524-25, 138 A.2d 1, 6 (1958) (general purpose of
cross-examination is to test recollection, credibility, accuracy).
81. See MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 9, at 17 (inspection to seek discrepancies between
document and testimony); Symposium, supra note 14, at 107 (inspection to determine
capacity of document to refresh recollection).
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chains of association suggests that a memory may have no readily ap-
parent connection with the content of a document; 2 therefore, testing
whether a witness's testimony depended on a document is not always
po~sible as a practical matter. For example, the materials may refresh
memory through a chain of associations that makes sense only to the
witness.s3 Under this second rationale, however, a legitimately re-
freshed recollection might be discredited simply because the trier of
fact could perceive no reason why the document should have refreshed
the memory in the manner alleged.
The third major rationale, that inspection is necessary in order to
protect against improper communications between counsel and wit-
ness, 4 is the only one that survives thoughtful analysis. The memory
refreshment doctrine accomplishes this goal by allowing opposing
counsel to scrutinize the materials in order to determine if they im-
properly prompt the witness.
Various aspects of the doctrine support this rationale for its existence.
For example, the trier of fact may see the memory refreshment ma-
terials8 5 This serves as a further safeguard that ensures that any
prompting is revealed. Another argument in support of this rationale
may be derived from the fact that the opposing attorney has the right
to see materials handed to the witness while the witness is on the stand,
yet no such automatic right exists with respect to pretestimony refresh-
ment materials.80 A plausible explanation of this rule is that the
primary goal of the refreshment doctrine is preventing the attorney
from prompting his witness, and such a danger is greatest while the
witness is testifying. Thus, in order to fulfill its purpose, memory re-
freshment doctrine need only encompass those materials that stimulate
the specific contents of a witness's testimony. 7 By limiting its reach
82. See United States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883, 888-90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S.
911 (1949); United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964, 967-68 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 806 (1947).
83. See, e.g., M. PROUST, SWANN'S WAY 34-35 (G. Moncrieff trans. 1970) (spoonful of
tea and crumbs causes considerable amount of "testimony" to be recalled).
84. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 233 (1940) (inspection
to avoid "improper communication with the witness"); United States v. Goldman, 118
F.2d 310, 314-15 (2d Cir. 1941), aff'd, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), overruled on other grounds,
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (same); cf. United States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d
883, 889 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 941 (1949) (trial judge must make sure that at-
torney is not using memory refreshment as device for telling witness what to say).
85. See note 20 supra.
86. See note 24 supra.
87. Memory refreshment doctrine is designed to prevent impermissible prompting
through written suggestions by the attorney of the answers he desires, during or im-
mediately preceding the testimony. The doctrine is not designed to deter the attorney
from impermissibly structuring a witness's testimony in situations where no genuine
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to materials used in order to refresh memory, the doctrine ensures that
materials that prompt testimony may be examined by opposing counsel.
The memory refreshment doctrine, therefore, exists to deter witness
prompting by revealing materials used to stimulate testimony to the
opposing counsel. Given this purpose, the relationship between the
memory refreshment doctrine and work product protection may be
examined in a new light.
B. Memory Refreshment Doctrine and Work Product Protection
An understanding of the purposes of the memory refreshment and
work product doctrines indicates that the two will rarely conflict.
Materials used for memory refreshment, and thus subject to inspection
under Rule 612, are not protected by the work product doctrine.1s
The work product doctrine only protects material that contains the
opinions or thought processes of the attorney.8 9 Such work product will
rarely become the subject of testimony,90 but if it does, there is no
longer any need to protect it. Once the testimony is given, there is
usually nothing left to keep secret. 91 Moreover, if the opinions or
thought processes of the attorney are included in materials that refresh
memory because of their factual content, only the factual information
memory refreshment is possible. Indeed, the doctrine would be ineffective for that pur-
pose because it could be easily circumvented by oral preparation. In addition, if a
lawyer prepares a witness with specific written materials, the doctrine will not come into
play if the witness falsely denies it. See note 29 supra.
88. Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11, 13 (N.D. Il1. 1972).
89. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947) (privacy essential for nonfactual
material and material that involves application of attorney thought processes to facts).
90. Witnesses testify to facts, not opinions. See MCCORMICK, supra note 16, §§ 10-11.
Only when specialized knowledge is required to assist the trier of fact in understanding
the evidence or determining a fact in issue may experts testify "in the form of an
opinion." FED. R. EVID. 702. The only witness whose testimony might be significantly
affected by work product, to an extent beyond usual witness preparation, is the expert
witness, and materials given to an expert may be open to discovery by an alternative
route. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4). In United States v. IBM Corp., 72 F.R.D. 78, 82
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), the court held that everything given to the expert witness was open to
discovery under FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(b)(4).
91. Most memory refreshment materials relate, at least indirectly, to the testimony
they stimulate. Occasionally, a document may revive a memory without itself having any
apparent connection with the resulting memory. See note 82 supra (citing cases). In those
few situations in which the refreshing document is work product and has no apparent
relation to the testimony, the attorney must choose which is more important, the testi-
mony or the privacy of the document. See Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11, 13
(N.D. Ill. 1972) (choice between using document to refresh memory and retaining attorney-
client privilege adhering to it). Such a concatenation of events will be rare, because it
will occur only when the document bears no resemblance to the testimony, the con-
tent of the testimony is directly affected by the work product itself, and there are no
alternative means of refreshment available.
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need be disclosed in order to serve the purpose of memory refresh-
ment doctrine.
92
When the contents of work product are used by a witness as part of
his testimony, or even when they substantially influence that testimony,
they necessarily contain facts in issue.93 Once the witness has identified
work product as the stimulus of his refreshed memory, the showing of
need necessary for discovery under Rule 26(b)(3) could be made on
that basis. In civil suits, the contents of a witness's testimony are often
known prior to trial, through deposition or interrogatory.94 When
answers appear for which there is no basis apparent to the opposing
party, a request for discovery of that basis-if any-might follow. If it
were claimed that the basis of the testimony was work product, the
Rule 26(b)(3) issue would then be reached.
When the witness's testimony at trial disagrees with testimony
supplied through discovery, and no basis for the discrepancy is ap-
parent, the witness may be discredited through the use of his prior in-
consistent statements.9" There will be no need for work product, even
if work product caused the change, for the purpose of discrediting
the witness through cross-examination.
It is only when testimony appears for the first time at trial or in
deposition, hence necessitating more rigorous cross-examination in
order to uncover improper prompting, and when the witness concedes
that he would not have so testified if he had not previously refreshed
his memory, that the Rule 612 issue arises. In that situation, inspection
should probably follow on the basis of the memory refreshment doc-
trine, even in those rare cases when the materials used to refresh the
witness's memory are work product. The intrusion on work product
protection in such a case is minimal because only materials actually
used to refresh memory must be disclosed.96
92. Memory refreshment doctrine itself protects work product that, although part of a
document used to refresh the memory of the witness, does not itself refresh that memory:
only the precise portion of the document that actually refreshes the witness's memory
may be inspected. See United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1973):
ihe rules governing documents used to refresh recollection could in no event justify
requiring Reeves to turn over his entire investigative report to the prosecution. As a
defense witness Reeves testified only as to two matters . ... Assuming they had been
used to refresh his recollection at trial, those parts of his investigative report relative
[sic] to this testimony and of possible use to the Government in cross-examining
Reeves with respect to this testimony would have to be turned over to the prosecution.
93. Since witnesses testify to facts, work product must contain at least some facts in
order to become the subject of testimony. See note 90 supra.
94. See United States v. IBM Corp., 68 F.R.D. 315, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
95. See FED. R. EvID. 613.
96. See note 92 supra.
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Conclusion
The goals of the memory refreshment doctrine are satisfied when
an opposing attorney has the opportunity to expose improper prompt-
ing of a witness. The goals of work product discovery are satisfied
when it is limited to factual information and does not include an
attorney's opinions or thought processes absent a showing of need. A
rule that discloses all materials seen by a witness prior to testifying is
too broad: it allows the discovery of work product for which no need
exists under either the memory refreshment or work product doctrines.
A proper understanding of the goals of the memory refreshment and
work product protection doctrines indicates that there is, in fact, no
conflict between Rule 612 and Rule 26(b)(3).
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